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This article examines the emergence of the various Iraqi security forces that were created by 
the U.S.-led coalition since it deposed Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. Based in part on his 
own observations and interviews with those responsible for training these forces, the author 
discusses the challenges and dilemmas faced by coalition forces in their attempts to create 
local security forces that will be capable of enforcing order and ending the insurgency.   
 
Coalition leaders consider Iraqis' ability to 
enforce their own security needs to be 
essential to resuscitating the Iraqi state, 
especially given the June 2004 turnover of 
power to a new government there. The 
existence of such credible, cohesive Iraqi 
security forces is also a necessary 
precondition for coalition troop drawdowns 
from Iraq.(1)  Fielding indigenous Iraqi 
security formations has thus become the 
highest priority.  
     The desertion or collusion with 
insurgents of large numbers of Iraqi 
soldiers and police during disturbances in 
central Iraq during the spring of 2004 
reinforced this pressing need.  Such 
developments also exposed important flaws 
in the recruitment, training, and equipping 
of Iraqi security personnel, rendering them 
as yet totally unprepared to contribute 
measurably to the country's security.  As 
anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi government 
violence continues, the need to improve 
Iraq's security forces remains pressing, 
even as coalition forces' relationships with 
the indigenous government and security 
officials change.   
     Coalition members in Iraq are currently 
conducting most of the training and 
equipping of Iraqi forces, though private 
security contractors and coalition-friendly 
governments have handled some 
training.(2)  Since late spring 2004, the 
various Iraqi security formations have been 
nominally reorganized as the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF), just as the coalition structures 
for training them have continued to evolve. 
Among different coalition areas of 
responsibility, the unification of 
recruitment, training, and equipping 
standards has lagged behind, as has the 
standardization of the order of battle.  The 
vision of each ISF branch's roles, future, 
and relationship with other branches has 
also remained undefined.  The now-
sovereign Iraqi government's extension of 
authority into increasing areas of national 
life is likely to complicate this process of 
definition, as new Iraqi personnel--with 
agendas that are as yet unclear--are sure to 
renegotiate relationships continually with 
each other and the coalition.   
 
THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: 
STRUCTURES 
     Since the autumn of 2003, widely 
differing statements about the numbers of 
Iraqi recruits, trainees, and personnel 
actively serving have emerged from a 
variety of official and unofficial sources.  
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Such statements--often motivated by 
political goals--routinely confuse different 
categories, such as Iraqis arriving at 
recruitment stations who may never 
actually enlist; those receiving wages in 
spite of rarely showing up to train or patrol; 
Iraqis in training but not service-ready; 
Iraqis serving without undergoing training 
of any sort; Iraqis in service with minimal 
"transitional" training; and finally, fully-
trained, regularly serving members of the 
Iraqi Security Forces. (3)   
     Further, some reports asserting 
satisfactory levels of training and manning 
use older targets, even though these goals 
continually shifted through the winter and 
spring of 2004.  Likewise, when reporting 
equipment provision, not all statements 
distinguish between equipment pledged 
and actually delivered, and rarely is 
reference made to quality of equipment, 
arms, and ammunition.  The result of such 
different reporting sources and motivations 
has recently been criticized as "a far less 
honest reporting system that grossly 
exaggerates the actual level of training," 
such that "status reports do even more to 
disguise the level of true progress" to a 
"simply unacceptable " degree.  References 
to quantitative data thus produce much 
more of a numbers haze, in spite of some 
recent heroic efforts to add clarity to the 
picture.(4) 
     Numerically, the largest service is the 
Iraqi Police Service (IPS), under the 
administrative control of the Iraqi Ministry 
of the Interior.  The ministry is intended to 
gradually take over operational control of 
the police from coalition units.  With 85-
95,000 personnel nationally, it illustrates 
the largest degree of continuity from before 
March 2003.  In any given locality, a 
number of commanders and patrolmen 
have either continued in place or returned 
to the job, either with or without coalition-
provided re-training.  Additionally, 
attached to the Iraqi Police is a multi-
company-sized formation to be deployed 
on the pattern of American police SWAT 
teams, while separate from the Police is a 
Counter Insurgency Force.    
     The Interior Ministry currently controls 
two more services.  The Iraqi Border Police 
concentrates in particular on managing 
transportation corridors in proximity to 
border outposts.  In addition, the Customs 
Police and civilian Customs Service 
actually operate in the border posts.  
Finally, the Facilities Protection Service 
emerged in the fall of 2003, and is intended 
to protect strategic infrastructure from 
insurgent attacks, as well as individual 
ministry assets.  On a monthly basis, the 
Ministry of Finance delivers funds to 
individual ministries, which then hire out 
elements of the Facilities Protection 
Service.  Often recruited on a local tribal 
basis, the FPS has grown in size from 
14,500 members in December 2003 to 
more than 70,000 in April-June 2004.  
     The Ministry of Defense controls fewer 
personnel, though the organizations are 
more substantive.  The Iraqi Armed Forces 
(IAF), previously dubbed the New Iraqi 
Army, is intended to be a small force, 
between 25-35,000 men, organized as three 
divisions and twenty-seven battalions.  
Plans call for designating between three 
brigades and a division (nine battalions; 
6,600 troops) as an Iraqi National Task 
force (now referred to as Iraqi Intervention 
Force), to combat terrorists and foreign 
anti-coalition forces within Iraq.  Further, a 
two battalion-sized formation will combine 
the Iraqi Counterterrorist Force and 
Commandos (about 1,600 troops) into an 
Iraqi Special Operations Force. 
     The current operational concept views 
the army as specifically directed away from 
domestic security enforcement and toward 
protecting Iraqi territorial integrity; though 
recently formed army units have been 
deployed domestically with mixed results.  
Given the outward focus, brigades are 
tethered by limited fuel, provisions, and 
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ammunition to something like a 70-
kilometer combat radius around their bases.   
     Rather than the old Iraqi army's 
mechanized infantry model, primary 
tactical formations are moto rized rifle 
battalions operating most frequently as 
companies.  Thus, rather than tracked 
heavy tactical vehicles mounting missile 
launchers, automatic cannon, or heavy 
machine guns, the Iraqi armed forces are to 
be truck-based with light armor and light 
machine guns.  These are thus sector 
defense formations.  Likewise, Iraqi air and 
naval assets are limited both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, with the air force planned 
to possess only several hundred men and 
provide only transport assets (C-130 
transport planes, UH-1H helicopters) able 
to accommodate several companies at a 
time.  The Coastal Defense Force is 
envisioned solely as a brown water 
(coastal) navy.   
     Rather than separate operating services, 
an Iraqi joint headquarters unifies 
command of a small army and minuscule 
air force and navy to a much higher degree 
than in other Middle Eastern armies (with 
the exception of Israel).(5)  Ultimately, 
given the threats of Syria and Iran as well 
as the tensions between Turkey and the 
Kurds, the small size of Iraq's army will 
require a coalition presence for an extended 
period, unless political expediency and 
coalition manpower difficulties force a 
hasty expansion of the IAF both 
quantitatively and in terms of weapons 
systems.   
     If the current Iraqi Army's shift away 
from domestic law enforcement as well as 
its severely emasculated table of 
organization and equipment continues, the 
much more significant force contributing to 
internal Iraqi security will be the Iraqi 
National Guard (ING).  It had been known 
as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) 
until the new Interim Iraqi government 
under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi renamed 
it.  The ING has been a problematic 
service, with an always -uncertain future.  
Originally emerging in late fall 2003 as an 
adjunct and support service to coalition 
units, its purpose evolved over winter 
2003-2004 to fill in the gap between the 
police and the army, the latter remaining 
notional during the same period.   
     During the first half of 2004, the ICDC 
was considered a cons tabulary force or 
light infantry with some tactical vehicle 
mobility able to deploy operationally with 
American units that would train, advise, 
and assist them.  Consequently, it was 
hoped, coalition force protection would 
improve as increasing duties would be 
undertaken with or by locally recruited 
forces which had greater linguistic and 
intelligence capabilities as well as an 
understanding of the people.  Likewise, it 
was important to coalition leaders to 
portray the ICDC as a leading and 
successful element in the indigenization of 
Iraqi government and security, thus 
demonstrating the coalition's sincerity in 
returning sovereignty to Iraq.(6) 
     The force's growth reflected this 
change.  By December 2003, there were 
15,000 members of the ICDC, with one 
800+ member battalion designated to serve 
in each of Iraq's eighteen provinces.  By 
April 2004, the corps had ballooned to 
about 32,000 members, and now stands at 
over 41,000, almost twice the army's size.   
     Originally under the ministry of the 
interior, the ICDC was turned over to the 
ministry of defense by Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 73 as "a 
component of the Iraqi Armed Forces. "(7)  
Now called the Iraqi National Guard, its 
units remain under the operational control 
of non-Iraqi coalition commanders. The 
ING's future administrative and operational 
command is uncertain.  Some coalition 
authorities, but especially the ING's own 
command, advocate its continued existence 
as a service separate from the Iraqi army.  
Others have proposed that over time the 
ING be trained more like a military service, 
Barak A. Salmoni 
 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) 14 
in preparation for its eventual absorption 
into the army itself.  Still other proposals 
foresee the ING being divided in several 
ways.  Each scenario possesses 
ramifications for the cohesion, strength, 
and potential political power of the forces 
concerned.   It also means that until a clear 
decision is made and accepted, it will be 
difficult for coalition commanders and 
trainers, as well as for Iraqis, to think 
strategically.   
 
TRAINING CHALLENGES 
     By mid-June 2004, only four of the 
Army's projected twenty-seven battalions 
had undergone training. The Kirkush base 
northeast of Baghdad is a primary location 
for recruit training.  Initially, basic training 
was provided to Iraqis by U.S. contractors 
from the Vinell Corporation, supervised by 
coalition military personnel under the 
overall command of Major General Paul 
Eaton.  Eaton, previously commander of 
the U.S. Army School of Infantry, was 
until June 2004 the coalition's senior 
military assistance officer, in charge of the 
Office of Security Cooperation.  
Initial army training, however, went 
poorly, with coalition personnel accusing 
the contractors of misunderstanding the 
Iraqi environment, instilling poor 
discipline, and not cultivating a sufficient 
commitment to the job.  The first battalion 
to form during training suffered nearly 50 
percent attrition even before it left its 
training base, partially due to the training 
deficiencies and partially due to the CPA's 
provision of woefully insufficient wages, 
even in Iraqi terms.  Speaking in December 
2003, Eaton remarked that "soldiers need 
to train soldiers. You can't ask a civilian to 
do a soldier's job."(8)  By mid-2004, he 
reiterated his criticisms, asserting that 
contractor-led training "hasn't gone well. 
We've had almost one year of no 
progress."(9)  By the end of 2003, U.S. 
Army units assumed closer control of basic 
training, with additional assistance from 
Jordanian and Australian forces.(10)       
     For the near future and barring any 
extreme contingencies, the ICDC/ING will 
remain the main effort of coalition trainers, 
followed by the Iraqi Police.  A coalition 
training initiative emerged in summer 
2003.  Yet, the political timetable driven by 
Western capitals and Iraqis themselves 
soon outpaced the security training 
timeline, just as various training 
infrastructures have differed from area to 
area and are only in summer 2004 taking 
the initial steps towards unification on a 
national level.  By some estimates, only 30 
percent of Police, ICDC, and Border Police 
officers had undergone coalition training 
by the handover of sovereignty to Iraqis on 
June 28, 2004.(11)  Complicating the 
matter, coalition forces must handle a pool 
of Iraqis with widely differing skills, 
experience, maturity, motivation, and basic 
education.   
     As regards the Police and National 
Guard, one may assume that the 
overwhelming majority have been attracted 
by the possibility of steady pay and not 
sympathy to the coalition or even Iraqi 
national pride.(12)  This fact influences 
levels of motivation to undergo difficult 
training, show up regularly for fixed hours 
of work, and undertake missions of any 
danger.  Likewise, many recruits served 
either in the old army or police forces, with 
the majority of ICDC officers having 
previous service.  This is not as much a 
problem of latent pro-Ba‘thi sympathies as 
of skill. 
     The sense of urgency in fielding the 
force combined with a hope that Iraqis 
having previous service would need very 
little re-training in basic police and infantry 
skills produced extremely short basic 
training programs, which lasted between 
ten days and three weeks.  Not only did this 
prove insufficient to train out old ways and 
assumptions, but also it could not fully 
prepare those raw recruits with no 
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significant prior service or training.(13)  In 
fact, at the platoon level of the ICDC, 
several soldiers have had no prior 
experience and are extremely young, 
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, 
having been encouraged to join by families 
desiring the funds.  These inexperienced 
recruits sometimes make the most 
enthusiastic, open-minded soldiers ready to 
learn.  This enthusiasm, however, only 
partially makes up for illiteracy.(14) 
     Further, with the exception of 
unconventional units whose direct-action 
mission load remains quite heavy, coalition 
forces do not possess large units and 
programs specifically designed to train 
culturally foreign forces.  In the fall and 
winter of 2003-2004, the responsibility for 
providing basic training to the Iraqi 
National Guard res ided with the units 
deployed to the area where that Iraqi 
element was to operate.  In March-June 
2004, larger brigade/regiment formations 
began standardizing basic training within 
their individual areas.  Since then, it 
appears that division- level training 
standardization has proceeded.(15)  In 
every case, coalition troops of disparate 
military specialties have worked to train 
the ING.  These have included 
infantrymen, armored and artillery corps 
personnel, and military police.  By contrast, 
personnel whose regular functions are 
training-related, such as drill sergeants and 
combined arms exercise trainers, are 
accustomed to very different operating 
environments and standards.   
     Conditions differ somewhat in the 
training of Iraqi law enforcement units, 
where coalition forces have relied on 
reservists with strong backgrounds in their 
countries' police, fire, and investigative 
departments.  In fact, it is often these 
reservists--and especially the senior non-
commissioned officers--who are best 
equipped as trainers, instinctively and 
through long service to understand how to 
adapt instruction methods and programs to 
the local environment.(16)  Likewise, 
certain army and marine civil affairs units 
possess similar skills, given their reserve 
background, while Marine Combined 
Action Platoons deploy after training in 
foreign culture, language, and weapons 
systems.(17)  Still, in the majority of cases, 
trainers arrive on scene without the 
requisite instructional, regional, cultural, or 
linguistic preparation, and often with 
insufficient logistical or material support.   
     Since the spring of 2004, and especially 
after the fighting of April and May around 
Najaf and Falluja, coalition forces have 
begun providing follow-on training to the 
Iraqi Police and ING.  Though formats 
vary, this often includes an enhanced 
platoon-training course.  Additionally, a 
non-commissioned officer (NCO) course 
focuses on strengthening both the NCO 
corps as well as the concept of an NCO in a 
military which has traditionally not 
conceived of it in the NATO sense.  An 
officers' course is attended by company- 
and battalion-level officers sent by their 
ICDC commanders.  From both these 
courses, graduates return to their parent 
commands and are distributed among units 
in the hope that they will communicate 
their new skills to others.   
      By May 2004, U.S., British, and 
Australian trainers instituted squad leader 
and NCO courses for the Iraqi Army as 
well, focusing on counterinsurgency and 
urban warfare.  Coalition trainers plan on 
indigenizing training over time, with 
graduates of the first NCO courses teaching 
subsequent raw recruits.(18)  By late June 
2004, about 1500 Iraqi officers had also 
graduated from the King Abdallah Military 
Academy in Zarqa, Jordan, with U.S. 
officials deeming them fit to take over 
training new recruits and officers in the 
future.(19)   
     In the law enforcement realm, police 
returning to the job with prior service often 
undergo a three-week Transitional 
Integration Program.  Instructors are often 
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reservists with law enforcement 
backgrounds, in addition to "international 
police advisers" who also evaluate police 
operations.  Working through translators, 
the vision is to indigenize the training staff 
over time here as well.  Numbers of fresh 
recruits as well as returning veterans also 
attend an eight-week Police Academy, 
either in Baghdad or Jordan. 
 
STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS? 
     These courses and coalition mentoring 
are part of an overall security assistance 
framework which continues to evolve.  
Before May 2004, foreign forces operating 
in Iraq functioned under the umbrella of 
Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), 
which was the overall coalition air-ground-
sea command, that has since then been 
renamed Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I). 
In this framework, the individual land 
components themselves mostly directed 
training of indigenous Iraqi security, 
particularly for the ICDC.   
     MNF-I is currently commanded by a 
four-star general (Gen George W. Casey), a 
change from CJTF-7, which was led by 
Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.  As 
such, the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-
I, commanded by Lieutenant General 
Thomas F. Metz), subordinate to MNF-I, is 
the operational follow-on to CJTF.  
Training structures come under MNC-I, are 
managed through an ISF coordinating 
office at the corps level, and have been 
grafted into the evolving relationship 
between MNC-I and the Iraqi ministries of 
defense and interior.   
     The Office of Security Cooperation 
(OSC), the main high- level coordination 
point for training between coalition and 
Iraqi forces, has since expanded.  Now 
commanded by Lieutenant General 
Petraeus, it is an upgraded version of 
American Offices of Military Cooperation 
in Egypt, the Gulf, and elsewhere.  OSC's 
military and police assistance offices are to 
develop training policy jointly with MNF-I, 
and serve as the point of direct senior-level 
liaison with the Iraqi Ministries of defense 
and interior, both of which are to be run by 
senior Iraqi officers.  OSC will then 
apportion tasks to the ISF assistance office 
at MNC-I, which is empowered to provide 
feedback and suggestions to OSC.  As OSC 
and MNC-I are both run by three-star 
generals, this has the potential to generate a 
certain amount of friction, and OSC will 
have to work to avoid becoming an added 
level of operationally obstructive 
bureaucracy.   
     By all accounts, Lieutenant General 
Petraeus was wisely chosen to lead 
coalition training of Iraqi forces.  The 
former commander of the American 101st 
Airborne Division, he was successful in 
working with indigenous forces in north-
central Iraq in the second half of 2003.  It 
should be noted, however, that the mostly 
Kurdish composition of those indigenous 
forces facilitated cooperation with the 
coalition.  And, while Petraeus and his staff 
have been conscientious in determining 
shortcomings of previous training efforts 
and in learning region-specific training 
needs, by mid-July 2004, he and his office 
had still to make a noticeable impact on 
local level coalition operations.(20) 
     The ISF office at the corps level 
provides orders and direction to the actual 
field components, now organized as six 
Multinational Divisions (MND) on a 
geographic basis throughout Iraq.  Each 
MND has its own ISF training cell, further 
subdivided according to coalition personnel 
working with individual Iraqi services.  As 
such, this requires coordination and 
agreement among coalition and Iraqi four-
star generals, two coalition three-star 
generals, and communication through to 
the coalition two-star general level 
(division), and execution through senior 
field grade officers commanding company-
grade officers and enlisted men.   
     This arrangement is potentially quite 
cumbersome and time-consuming, with an 
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abundance of over-interested participants.  
This invites tangles of input, direction, and 
feedback, or slow-downs.  It also entails 
practical and operational difficulties, for 
example involving timelines for providing 
equipment.  Further, greater complications 
might ensue in areas where forces are truly 
multinational (i.e. not just U.S. or British) 
and have multiple commanders, such as in 
the central-south of Iraq. The situation is 
also likely to become complicated where 
U.S. forces have intermediary commands 
between MNC-I and the divisional level, 
such as in western Iraq where the 1st 
Marine Expeditionary Force (a three-star 
command) is in overall control of the 1st 
Marine Division.  
 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS 
     A persistent conceptual difficulty is that 
U.S. forces have yet to implement the train-
advise-assist model of creating indigenous 
military and constabulary forces.  Coalition 
units tasked to train Iraqis are often 
structurally or by regulation unable to 
patrol with them.  As such, the personal 
relationships and training-operating 
continuum--historically so essential to 
effective indigenous force creation--are 
insufficient.  Whereas in most regular 
militaries, particularly the American, 
depersonalization and discontinuity are 
built into the training and operating 
dynamic so as to encourage a unit-as-
machine conception and interoperability, in 
training foreign, ethnically different forces 
this elicits problems of establishing trust, 
track-record, rapport, and problem-solving 
abilities.  ING officers themselves have 
repeatedly complained about coalition 
trainers' and units' aloofness from Iraqi 
soldiers and disinterest in interacting 
meaningfully with them.(21)  Again, the 
exception to these discontinuities are 
among those Special Forces units 
recruiting, mentoring, and operating with 
Iraqis, as well as those Marine Combined 
Action Platoons whose areas of operation 
permit them to live, train, and patrol with 
ING and Iraqi Police.   
     A parallel problem creating the same 
effect is the short time span of training 
programs, most of which last no more than 
three weeks.  Part of the brevity of the 
training programs has been politically 
dictated, to provide the appearance of 
Iraqification which, it is hoped, will 
snowball into greater acceptance of the 
coalition as well as a greater indigenous 
desire to support or join the ICDC or 
police.  Likewise, the basic need for more 
Iraqis out on the street carrying out some 
fundamental tasks of public security has 
driven shorter training-spans able to 
generate graduates sooner.  Conversely, 
certain trainers themselves lamenting the 
ineffectiveness of short training periods 
still favor them as a rear-guard measure to 
restrain the development of Iraqis' military 
competence, which could be turned against 
the coalition if they were to join the 
insurgents.(22)  
     Equally of concern, therefore, the 
coalition currently displays a bias towards 
training initial cadres of Iraqi soldiers and 
National Guardsmen who will then go on 
to instruct and train Iraqis themselves with 
gradually scaled-back coalition oversight.  
This has become known as the "train the 
trainer" approach.  While several Iraqis are 
pleased to be seen as autonomous from 
foreign forces and appreciate the ability to 
command fellow Iraqis, "training the 
trainer" raises the likelihood that the 
mentoring and monitoring bond between 
coalition forces and Iraqi counterparts will 
be broken too soon, allowing for a 
precipitous decline in standards, 
accountability, and operational 
dependability.  In contrast to coalition 
authorities' overly enthusiastic public 
statements about the Iraqification of 
security and accelerated indigenization of 
training, senior U.S. officers intimately 
familiar with the ISF have cautioned that 
several years and a sustained coalition 
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human and material commitment will be 
necessary to train credible Iraqi forces.(23)   
 
ONGOING DIFFICULTIES 
     These difficulties of training indigenous 
forces in Iraq are unavoidable in an 
environment where coalition forces must at 
the same time engage in humanitarian aid, 
reconstruction efforts, and all aspects of 
military operations from police action to 
high-intensity combat.  In this context there 
are simply too many pressing concerns to 
devote sufficient amounts of time to any 
one task.  Furthermore, notable progress 
has been made in assembling ING and 
Police units that remain credible and 
cohesive.  Success occurs when resourceful 
young coalition officers possess enough 
training and operational autonomy from 
senior command.  If the environment 
permits, such young leaders can then 
locate, promote, and create personal bonds 
with Iraqi counterparts with the charisma 
and concern for their enlisted troops to 
motivate them and instill unit pride.  
Likewise, it requires coalition troops' 
willingness to educate, arm, and patrol with 
Iraqis, often in spite of recent experiences 
fighting against Iraqis themselves--many of 
whom, in April-May, were deserters from 
the Iraqi Police and Civil Defense Corps.  
     Investing these efforts requires a shift 
from a bureaucratic American military-as-
machine mindset which emphasizes speed, 
unit interoperability, personnel 
interchangeability, and depersonalization 
of processes.  Coalition troops who succeed 
in motivating ISF have come to grasp and 
indeed value the time needed in Arab 
cultures to create personal, quasi-brother-
like relationships with Iraqi counterparts.  
Taking this time has come to be understood 
as part of the painstaking, exhausting 
process of identifying trustworthy Iraqi 
officers and credible NCOs, who often 
become profoundly loyal to their American 
friends, perhaps more than to the Iraqi 
national cause.  Further, successful 
American commanders increasingly 
understand that their desires will be 
interpreted less as orders and more as the 
beginning of a negotiating process in which 
Americans need to remain sensitive to 
Iraqis' sense of manhood, self, and 
appearance before peers.  Coalition troops 
must also grasp and work through the 
seeming paradox of Arab senior officers' 
disdain for junior officers and enlisted men 
combined with a tendency of Iraqi soldiers 
to temporarily disregard hierarchy. 
American commanders have had Iraqi 
privates walk directly up to them or Iraqi 
counterparts and complain about training or 
operating conditions.  When coalition 
troops become comfortable with these 
dynamics, or accustom themselves to 
tolerating their own discomfort, truly 
exemplary coalition-ISF relationships have 
developed.   
     Quite frequently, however, as coalition 
units rotate out of an area, these personal 
relationship-driven dynamics have to be 
recreated, compromising progress made 
during the previous unit-Iraqi force 
relationship.  This then requires a great 
amount of patience on the part of 
commanders new to the scene, as well as a 
readiness to learn from their predecessors.  
The latter as well confront much 
frustration, since difficulties with Iraqis in 
personal relationships, training, and 
operating habits are rarely solved but tend 
to crop back up repeatedly.(24)   
     Particularly as regards the ING, 
recruitment policies themselves also entail 
ongoing problems and debates.  By and 
large, personnel for this service have been 
deployed in the localities where they live.  
Coalition planners reasoned that Iraqis 
living in, recruited from, and working in 
the same area would understand local 
political, economic, and criminal dynamics 
best, and would also be perceived by 
civilians as much less intrusive than 
Americans.  Likewise, in a society with 
several cross-cutting ethnic, sectarian, 
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geographic, and family cleavages, local 
Iraqis would conduct themselves better and 
be perceived as less obstreperous.  In this 
view, nightmare scenarios would entail 
Shi'i or Kurdish personnel brutalizing 
Sunni and Arab areas; ethnically and 
religiously mixed units crumbling due to 
internal friction or, at the least, Iraqi units 
operating ineffectively due to their lack of 
local knowledge. 
     This policy itself, however, has created 
problems.  Skeptical Iraqis presumed the 
ICDC to be a weak, cowardly service 
established by the occupation merely to do 
the latter's bidding.  Initially, troops 
therefore often disguised themselves by 
covering the ir faces or discarding their 
uniforms so as not to be associated with the 
service.  Sometimes, such practices were in 
response to intimidation from local 
insurgency leaders or criminal 
elements.(25)  Still, these measures only 
reinforced many Iraqi civilians' suspicions, 
at the same time inhibiting the emergence 
of an esprit de corps. Alternatively, ICDC 
troops and police were sometimes so 
enmeshed in local dynamics that they 
manipulated their status and engaged in 
corrupt practices--which many Iraqis 
suspected in any case.   
     Likewise, membership of ING, Police, 
and Border Police personnel in local 
extended families sometimes discourages 
troops from aggressively pursuing 
criminals who might be related to them.  In 
the same fashion, tribes in both the west 
and south have historically straddled the 
Syrian-Iraqi and Saudi-Iraqi borders.  
Often, Border Police officers from the 
Shammar and Jubbur tribes, for example, 
ignore their kinsmen's smuggling out of 
concern for tribal loyalty and their own 
livelihood.(26)  Alternatively, work in 
these services as well as the Facilities 
Protection Service could be manipulated as 
family- or geographically-based means for 
nepotism or protection rackets.  In this 
case, relatives of FPS guards would attack 
the very sites the ir brethren were protecting 
in order to encourage coalition 
commanders to provide better pay to the 
guards or more slots in the service to that 
local family.  In similar fashion, police 
have failed to assist the ING in 
apprehending suspects in favor of family-
based informal justice.(27)  In such 
circumstances, the failure of so many units 
to report or remain reliable during the 
disturbances in Ramadi, Falluja, and Najaf 
is understandable.   
     Yet, the desire to change business as 
usual and get Iraqis to think in "rational" as 
opposed to the "corrupt" ways privileging 
family, locality, or sect runs up against the 
realities of an Iraq atomized by previous 
regimes.  Coalition commanders have had 
to either prohibit, or more often 
countenance after the fact, moves of ICDC 
and police commanders to fire personnel in 
order to bring in relatives.  Similarly, 
disciplining an Iraqi officer for not 
cooperating with someone due to 
geographic or family differences will likely 
provoke all of that Iraqi's regional or 
familial kinsmen to walk off the job.(28)   
     Likewise, some of the best successes in 
recruiting and deploying Iraqi security 
formations--even during periods of intense 
nationwide insurgency activity--have been 
achieved on straight extended family or 
geographical lines, and with a tacit 
American understanding that these family-
based units operate for reasons only 
partially congruent with coalition goals, 
and with specific geographic constraints or 
interests of their own.  Conversely, there 
have been cases where conscientious Iraqi 
commanders have appointed subordinates 
based on merit instead of local origin or kin 
relations, only to find that neither troops 
nor local residents accept the qualified 
leader, thus forcing the coalition 
commander to suggest an alternate, more 
acceptable person.  This is a persistent, 
vexing problem, as junior and senior 
coalition officers repeatedly confront the 
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dilemma that the strategic goals, if pursued 
consistently and conscientiously, will 
imperil near-to-mid term initiatives, while 
stop-gap solutions and interim approaches 
undermine strategic goals. (29) 
     For their own part, Iraqi officers in all 
services frequently voice the complaint 
corroborated by coalition commanders that 
uniforms, equipment, and living conditions 
remain substandard, both in absolute terms 
as well as in comparison to that of their 
coalition counterparts--or even the 
insurgents themselves.(30)  Part of this is a 
reflection of the changing roles of any 
given service.  For example, the equipment 
needs of the ICDC when perceived simply 
as an adjunct sentry support element 
(providing added security to coalition 
installations and units operating in an urban 
environment) were very different from that 
same service's needs as it is now perceived 
as a cross-over constabulary to light 
infantry force (i.e. a reinforced police 
service that can also undertake basic 
infantry offensive and defensive operations 
alongside of coalition units). 
     More fundamentally, equipment 
problems have resulted from the logistical 
and bureaucratic shortcomings affecting 
the coalition, and which have resulted in 
only $220 million of the U.S. government-
apportioned $2.9 billion being spent on 
security assistance by mid-July.(31)  
Provision of uniforms, boots, weapons, 
radios, vehicles, body armor--even tents, 
meals, and sanitation facilities--is often 
delayed by disagreements among field 
units, higher headquarters, and national 
level coalition political-military authorities 
about who will provide what according to 
which timetable, at a cost to whom. (32)  In 
such conditions, division- or 
regimental/brigade- level logisticians are 
often forced to locate, purchase, and 
provision materials at direct cost to the 
field units. As a consequence, according to 
one prepared report of July 2004, "Iraqi 
forces have about 40 percent of their 
minimum weapons' needs, less than one-
third of the minimum number of vehicles, 
about 25 percent of the necessary 
communications gear, and about 25 percent 
of the necessary body armor."(33) 
     There are several effects of the 
bottlenecks and slowdowns.  First, they 
degrade the operational effectiveness of 
Iraqi units.  Second, as Iraqi police or 
soldiers look to their American 
counterparts' equipment, they find their 
own materiel quite poor by comparison. 
Third, this same phenomenon of an 
equipment and appearance gap elicits 
Iraqis' suspicion that members of Western, 
largely Christian coalition forces consider 
Iraqis civilizationally unequal or unworthy 
of the same respect.  Fourth, constant 
delays in equipment deliveries, and the low 
quality of some of the equipment, 
inadvertently convey negative messages to 
American trainers about the priority 
attached by higher-echelon commanders 
and administrators either to the lower-
echelon efforts, or to training programs as a 
whole.  This equipment differential will 
continue to be a challenge, particularly if 
the effort in Iraq is not truly 
internationalized while the coalition 
financial commitment necessarily 
lessens.(34) 
 
THE TRUST AND CREDIBILITY GAP 
     Finally, many of these issues lead to 
basic uncertainties that coalition trainers 
and commanders have: can Iraqis wearing 
the uniform of the ISF be trusted?  Will 
they cooperate with coalition units, or has 
insurgent activity intimidated them, 
inspiring fear more than mission 
commitment?(35)  Are they sufficiently 
skilled to do their basic jobs?  Across Iraq, 
soldiers and Marines repeatedly recount 
stories of Iraqi soldiers sleeping at 
checkpoints, inattentively manning gates, 
perfunctorily searching vehicles, and 
handling weapo ns with a dangerous degree 
of disregard for basic weapons safety.(36)  
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These practices have not been seen to 
improve at the needed speed.  As for trust, 
in addition to continued soldiers' and police 
officers' absenteeism, quitting, and solely 
financial motives for service, coalition 
forces continue to encounter difficulties 
getting ISF personnel to patrol with them, 
while actual cooperation is often quite 
reluctant.   
     Quite frequently as well, U.S. forces 
confront insurgents who have until recently 
been affiliated with the ING or Police.  
Particularly during the Falluja battles of 
April-May 2004, U.S. Marines and soldiers 
fought against insurgents still wearing their 
uniforms while firing on coalition 
positions.(37)  Similarly, non-deserting 
units continue to refrain from supporting 
coalition forces under fire.(38)  American 
commanders thus routinely counsel their 
soldiers to assume that the Iraqi units with 
which they operate are penetrated by 
insurgents, or that new recruits are sitting 
on the fence or "double dipping, " waiting 
to see if coalition forces or insurgents are 
more effective or lucrative in a given area. 
     Since the handover of sovereignty to the 
new Iraqi government, events have taken a 
turn as yet difficult to analyze.  In some 
instances, Iraqi units seemed to gain a 
much greater degree of confidence and 
mission-commitment almost overnight, 
leaving coalition counterparts both 
gratified that Iraqis would now operate and 
disappointed that they had not "stepped up 
to the plate" earlier.(39)  Iraqi soldiers and 
commanders who before June 28, 2004, 
had displayed a clear dissatisfaction at 
having to work with and answer to 
American officers, for example, now 
unilaterally undertake operations, 
sometimes with much greater effectiveness, 
but sometimes without prior consultation.   
     Alternatively, they have restricted joint 
operations to a minimal amount of prior 
consultation, after which coalition units 
patrol one street while its partner Iraqi unit 
remains in another sector of town.  These 
actions can be understood as a normal 
assertion of sovereignty at the local level--
even though theoretically the ISF remains 
under coalition operational control.  Still, 
Iraq's political stability and security 
situation remain quite uncertain even while 
ISF training is still incomplete both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore, 
as the competence and dependability of 
indigenous Iraqi ISF commanders are 
questionable, the ever-accelerating 
Iraqification of the ISF's training, local 
operational autonomy, and national level 
command may very well undermine 
operational effectiveness as the price of 
political expediency. 
 
TOWARDS THE FUTURE 
     Ultimately, the emergence of a new 
Iraqi security network will require coalition 
officials and Iraqis themselves to define 
more clearly how different services will 
relate to each other, the sovereign Iraqi 
government, the coalition, and Iraqi society 
at large.  Given the exceedingly fluid 
nature of the ISF and Iraqi government's 
evolution, resolving these matters will take 
some time.  Yet, the stakes for everyone 
involved are quite high, demanding an 
early, workable resolution. 
     As for the past as an operational guide, 
coalition trainers and commanders will 
need to consider broad Arab and Iraqi 
trends.(40)  On a basic level, Iraqi forces in 
every one of their major engagements since 
the 1960s have proven tactically 
impoverished down to the most junior 
levels and the most basic skills.     
     Just as important is the well-known 
reciprocal disdain of senior officers for 
junior officers and all officers for enlisted 
men.  Likewise, Arab and Iraqi officers 
have never fully appreciated the 
importance of non-commissioned officers.  
These practices-- encouraged by an 
autocratic regime, Soviet military model, 
and highly stratified society--do violence to 
morale, mission-commitment, and unit 
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cohesion, just as they punish initiative. All 
these drawbacks are also identical to what 
coalition trainers and commanders 
encounter on a daily basis in working with 
Iraqi Security Forces.    
     Further, at every level, Iraqi forces in 
the past have operated in a command, 
control, communications (C3) black hole, 
as commanders do not communicate 
horizontally out of excessive 
competitiveness, and hinder upward 
information flows out of a desire not to 
pass on unpleasant information reflecting 
poorly on lower- level commanders.  
Interservice communication has been 
hopeless, while an excessive centralization 
of decision-making and what information 
there is at the top has compromised field 
units.   
     In contemporary Iraq as in other Arab 
countries, it is not simply an issue of 
fiefdom formation within services.  Such 
patterns are particularly worrisome given 
the relationship of different services to 
each other and evolving views of the future 
missions of the ISF.  By July 2004, at least 
eleven acknowledged security forces or 
sub- forces had emerged, in addition to a 
newly created General Security 
Directorate, an intelligence service.(41)  
These eleven organizations each have their 
own competitive material, political, and 
corporate interests.   
     The track records of civil-military 
relations in Iraq and other Arab countries 
illustrate a multiplication of force, and 
tendency for rulers to use different security 
and military forces to counterbalance each 
other.  Indeed, the proliferation of forces in 
Iraq is now recalling pre-2003 trends.(42)  
For now, we may note that in the winter 
and spring of 2003-2004, problems 
between the Police and ICDC were 
constant,(43) involving lack of 
informational and operational coordination 
and ongoing animosities around equipment, 
wages, and status.  In some situations 
Police and ICDC would talk neither to each 
other nor to Iraqi municipal officials.   
     In late spring and early summer 2004, 
coalition commanders began establishing 
Joint Coordination Centers concentrating 
on the Police and ING in particular.(44)   In 
some places, different service 
representatives have exhibited an earnest 
desire to work together.  Yet, with 
technical hurdles related to 
communications equipment and operating 
procedures, often the coalition 
representatives themselves had to do the 
coordinating.  Sometimes, in the midst of 
pre-planned joint operations involving 
coalition forces and more than one Iraqi 
service, quarrels among Iraqis about 
timing, procedures, or command would 
interrupt matters, stunting the actual 
progress of units.(45)   
     Likewise, when Arab regimes are not 
controlled by an overwhelmingly powerful 
dictatorship, authorities in different 
ministries and offices have tended to use 
the deployment, funding, and equipping of 
coercive forces in power-plays within 
government.  In this respect, who controls 
what parts of the ISF is important to 
consider.  In the current interim 
government, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is 
likely to view the ISF as his central tool in 
undermining the insurgency and supporting 
his own regime, to the point of assembling 
monopolistic and authoritarian powers by 
Western standards.  He has recently 
signaled his preference to focus resources 
on the Iraqi Intervention Force and Special 
Operations Force.  He also prefers to 
control them through a command center in 
his own office, as opposed to channels 
within the ministries of defense and 
interior.  His office is also to lead a 
Ministerial Committee for National 
Security, and ostensibly oversee a Joint 
Operating Center, meant to link field -level 
Joint Command Centers with the national 
leadership.  Iraqi ministers of defense and 
interior will have representatives at the 
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Joint Operations Center, as will, at least 
theoretically, commanders of the 
Multinational Force-Iraq.(46)  
     This evolving picture suggests a very 
strong prime minister marshalling the most 
effective striking forces, with a still cloudy 
political-military C3 relationship between 
the coalition and Iraqis.  A strong prime 
minister might be in coalition interests, and 
may be able to provide stability and unity 
of command on the Iraqi side.  Yet, given a 
recent past of an overly powerful Iraqi 
chief executive, coalition leaders will have 
to ensure that Allawi remains of the same 
mind as are they.  They will also have to 
ensure that interim measures of control--
political promotions within the ISF, 
frequent rotations of commanders, 
ministerial interference in operational 
matters, arbitrary sackings, and so on--do 
not become routine, especially as they have 
been second nature among Iraqi leaders for 
the past several decades. 
     For now, Allawi appears to have 
encouraged his deputy prime minister, 
Barham Salih, to take a key role in defense 
decision-making, in addition to opening 
lines of communication with insurgents.  
Likewise, Salih, an official of the more 
unified Iraq-oriented Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan, might be able to assure the 
loyalty of certain Kurdish factions to 
Baghdad security authorities.  Or, he might 
act as a focus of alternate loyalties on the 
part of security forces, though for now 
Allawi appears in control, as the interim 
defense minister.   
     Likewise, no uniformed commander has 
been able to emerge yet to challenge the 
interim government's authority.  The 
coalition-supported Allawi has distributed 
top army roles across the major ethnic and 
confessional groups.  The senior military 
adviser, General Babekr al-Zibari is 
Kurdish with experience as a Peshmerga 
fighter. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
General Amir Ahmad Bakr al-Hashimi, is a 
Sunni Arab, while his deputy, Lieutenant 
General al-Assal, is Shiite.  Clearly, Allawi 
has reached out to the Kurds through Salih 
and Zibari, though the latter two 
individuals' ethnic bonds bear 
monitoring.(47)  Both al-Hashimi and al-
Assal served as officers in the Saddam-era 
military.  Al-Hashimi ended his career as 
deputy commandant at the Military 
Academy and then went on to sit on the 
Baghdad City Council; an infantryman, 
Assal was a divisional commander and 
then taught at a military college.  
     Ultimately, the commanders of the ING 
and Police will be important figures though 
as yet there are not nation-wide heads of 
these services.  Indeed, governmental 
structures, political alliances, and 
surrounding security conditions remain too 
fluid to mark out a clear picture of evolving 
civil-military entanglements.  Still, given 
Iraq's recent past and current evolving 
security challenges and political conditions, 
coalition commanders will need to exert 
tremendous energy to avoid an outcome 
that would undermine both ISF 
effectiveness and the political 
reconstruction of Iraq.   
     The still unclear vision of the future 
roles and status of different branches of the 
ISF makes this effort all the more difficult.  
The Army is not intended to have a 
domestic role. It was used in this capacity, 
however in late spring 2004, raising issues 
of where the Police leave off, the National 
Guard begins, and then the Army takes 
over.  If the National Guard is considered a 
constabulary force, training programs 
emphasizing light infantry skills might not 
be appropriate, though it is good 
preparation for integration with the army.  
If the latter occurs though, it will disrupt 
chains of command, the rank structure, and 
Iraqi officers' perception of their own 
prestige.  Merging the National Guard with 
the Army will also re-insert family and 
geographical factors into military-military 
as well as military-civil relations.  
Likewise, if the Army is to have no 
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domestic role and be curtailed from a 
power projection role, it will overlap in its 
roles and range with the Border Patrol. 
     Coalition trainers continue to remark at 
the lack of vision for the ING in particular, 
including cloudy descriptions of its 
functions and delays in developing firm 
tables of organization and equipment.  The 
latter criticism is also heard in reference to 
the Border Police.(48)  Any Iraqi or 
coalition security planner must thus be 
concerned about the creeping proliferation 
of services and overlapping of roles, in the 
absence of clear guidelines and mission 
descriptions. 
     The timetable to becoming a more 
sovereign coercive force will determine the 
ability of the ISF to overcome these 
challenges.  If the Iraqi government 
responds to popular clamoring for greater 
sovereignty by pressing the coalition for 
more control of the security realm, 
coalition leaders are likely to respond 
favorably as they search for an exit strategy 
amid declining domestic support for 
maintaining American troops in Iraq.  
Conversely, an intensified insurgency or 
the adventurism of Syria and Iran may 
force the coalition to build up the ISF in 
terms of personnel, weapons, and 
autonomy from the coalition itself.   
     Yet, an accelerated approach, which has 
characterized coalition political action of 
late, risks turning a potential pillar of Iraqi 
law, order, stability, and sovereignty into 
an instrument of a free Iraq's still-birth.  
More broadly, continued observation of the 
ISF's evolution will provide much insight 
into how to establish multiple security 
forces in midst of an insurgency, in a 
culturally foreign environment recovering 
from an autocracy which both corrupted 
coercive forces and used them as a political 
tool in domestic repression and foreign 
adventurism. 
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